Contingent Stimulus in Crowdfunding
时 间：2017年4月28日（周五）下午 15:00-16:30
地 点：体育外围平台APP紫金港校区行政楼302会议室
主讲人：Prof. Jiahua Wu, Imperial College London
主持人：周伟华教授，体育外围平台APP
摘 要：
A crowdfunding project is successfully funded if and only if the predetermined funding goal is achieved within a given time. We propose a model to characterize the dynamics of a project's pledging process. In particular, we show that there exists a "cascade effect" on backers' pledging, which is mainly driven by the all-or-nothing nature of crowdfunding projects. According to our data collected from the most popular crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter, the majority of projects fail to achieve their goals. To address this issue, we propose three contingent stimulus policies, namely, seeding, feature upgrade and limited-time offer. We show that the optimal stimulus policies have a cutoff-time structure. Then we propose simple heuristics derived from the deterministic counterpart of the stochastic model and show that they are asymptotically optimal when the problem is scaled up. Lastly, we show that the benefit of contingent policies is greatest in the middle of crowdfunding campaigns.
主讲人简介：
Jiahua Wu is an Assistant Professor of Operations at Imperial College Business School, Imperial College London, UK. He received his Ph.D. in Operations Management from Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. His research interests include operations-marketing interface, behavioral decision-making, revenue management, and supply chain management.
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